産 業 關 係 硏 究

第23卷 第4號, 2013. 12. pp.95~116

ⓒ 韓 國 雇 傭 勞 使 關 係 學 會

논문접수일 : 2013년 10월 8일, 심사의뢰일 : 2013년 10월 22일, 심사완료일 : 2013년 12월 11일

** 본 논문에 대하여 제언을 주시고 질적 발전에 기여해 주신 익명의 심사자께 감사드립니다.

** 고려대학교 스페인․라틴아메리카 연구소 연구교수, 02-3290-2578, kmwf@korea.ac.kr

産業關係硏究 제23권 제4호

비정규직 노동자의 고용안정성 확보를 위한 투쟁의 유형화 (김주희)

비정규직 노동자의 고용안정성 확보를 위한 투쟁의 유형화: 내부연대성, 외부연대성,
투쟁자원 요인 분석 연구*

김 주 희**

본 연구는 고용안정을 확보하기 위한 비정규직 노동자들의 투쟁을 MDS 분석틀을 사용하여 쟁의행위를 한 비정규직 노동자 조직의 내부연대성의 수준, 정규직 노동자들의 연대인 외부연대 수준, 투쟁자원에 따라서 그 유형을 파악하였다.

정규직 노조간부와 비정규직 노조간부들을 대상으로 한 인터뷰를 통해서 투쟁기금과 조직률, 정규직 노동자들의 비정규직 노동자에 대한 연대성을 각각 파악하였고 이를 기준으로 분석한 결과 4가지 유형으로 나타났다. 분석결과에 따른 유형들의 투쟁특징을 분석한 결과 내부연대성, 투쟁자원, 정규직의 지원수준이 높은 유형의 경우 정규직과 유사한 쟁의행위를 하는 특징이 나타났으며(institutionalised struggle), 내부연대성과 투쟁자원은 높으나 정규직의 지원수준이 낮은 유형의 경우 외부 단체의 지원을 전략적으로 활용하는 특징이 나타났으며(externalised struggle), 내부연대성과 투쟁자원에 비하여 정규직의 지원수준이 월등히 높은 경우 정규직 노조의 지원에 대한 의존성이 높은 특징이 나타났고(substituted struggle), 내외부 연대성과 투쟁자원이 모두 낮은 경우 극단적인 투쟁 전략을 구사(fragmented struggle)하는 특징이 나타났다. 본 연구 결과 정규직 노동자들의 지원수준과 비정규직 노조의 투쟁자원 수준이 극단적인 투쟁전략 구사 여부를 결정하는 주요 영향요인이었다.

▶ 주제어: 비정규직 노동자, 고용안정성, 연대성, 외부연대성, 내부연대성, 투쟁자원

I. Introduction

This study classifies and analyses the confrontational struggles of non-regular workers in South Korea for employment security and equal conditions with regular workers. In recent years, the struggles of non-regular workers have been a matter of great concern in South Korea. These struggles have recently become intense and confrontational, as an increasing number of non-regular workers aspire to join unions and take collective actions for better working and wage conditions. The increase in non-regular workers has also contributed to the increase in these struggles’ volume and volatility. The forms of these struggles vary depending on the workers’ internal solidarity, resources and external solidarity with regular workers within the same workplace.

The confrontational collective actions by non-regular workers are mostly considered as unconventional forms of struggle. Unlike the collective actions of regular workers, those of non-regular or subcontracted workers tend to be long-term, extreme and unorganised. Furthermore, these actions use extreme and militant tactics when employers do not respond to the non-regular workers’ demands. However, some of these actions do not differ significantly from those of regular workers.

Previous studies (Cho, 2009; Jung, 2000, 2003) argued that non-regular workers’ external solidarity with regular workers is essential to their successful negotiations with employers as regular workers can effectively put pressure on their employers to respond to the demands of the non-regular workers. However, such solidarity with regular workers can be difficult to achieve since participating in such collective actions with non-regular workers may also threaten the employment terms and conditions and job security of regular workers (Heery & Abbott, 2000).

Recognising that the struggles of non-regular workers vary, this study examines what influences these workers to use extreme and militant tactics. In particular, organisational power and external factors such as internal solidarity, resource and external solidarity with regular workers are used as key dimensions for determining the forms of struggle. The types of struggles are then identified by developing an inductively and empirically based typology using a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique. The resulting typology is intended to serve as a comprehensive classification of the struggles of non-regular workers, highlighting the similarities and differences among the different struggles, as well as their underlying dimensions.

II. Previous Studies

Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the number of non-regular workers has increased since employers resorted to hiring non-regular workers to have flexible workforce arrangements and to minimise labour costs (Jin & Kim, 2007; Kim & Kim, 2003; Lee & Lee, 2003). While regular workers protected by their unions are entitled to negotiate with their employers, non-regular workers are mostly unorganised (Jin & Kim, 2007) and are vulnerable to labour market fluctuations (Kalleberg, 2000). Without legal protection from the threat of dismissal by employers, non-regular workers cannot fully exercise collectively bargain rights and take action against employers to achieve fair wages and decent working conditions (Eun, 2007; Nienhuser & Matiaske, 2006). Employers tend to ignore the demands of non-regular workers’ unions and for the most part do not recognise them (Heery & Abbott, 2000). Because employers tend to take more offensive measures against non-regular workers than against regular workers, the struggles of non-regular workers usually last longer than those of regular workers. Even if they succeed in getting to the negotiation table, the negotiations often reach an impasse, and to break the impasse they have to use militant tactics (Cho, 2011). The struggles of non-regular workers tend to be confrontational because the number of non-regular workers is small so that the collective action taken by them is not strong enough to put pressure on employers to be responsive to their demands. Therefore, non-regular workers are likely to resort to militant tactics (Cho, 2011; Lee & Lee, 2003).

According to the Ministry of Statistics of Korea, Supplementary Results of the Economically Active Population Survey in August 2012 shows that size of non‐regular workers has increased from 8,280,000 in 2010 to 8,480,000, which accounts for 47.8% of total workforce. The number of union members of non‐regular workers in 2012 were around 180,000 and density rate was 2.1%. The size and density rate is far below when compared to those of regular worekrs(20.1% of density rate).

Therefore, solidarity with regular workers is essential for non-regular workers since regular workers can effectively place pressure on employers to give non-regular workers better working and employment conditions (Cho, 2009; Jung, 2000, 2003). However, regular workers’ unions have not been well disposed towards non-regular workers (Gumbrell McCormick, 2011; Heery, 2004a; Kalleberg, 2000). With increased employment insecurity, the sense of solidarity among workers declined (Shin, 2010). To overcome the unionised regular workers’ indifference to the non-regular workers’ intensifying struggles, the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) began campaigning for solidarity between regular and non-regular workers, and some organised workers started to support the non-regular workers’ struggles. This support enabled some non-regular workers to win better working conditions. However, although some organised workers have started to accept non-regular workers as part of their constituency (Yun, 2010), the majority of organised workers remain unsupportive of the struggles of non-regular workers.

The strikes by non-regular workers are not powerful enough to bring about work stoppages because of their low density and because regular workers are put to work as alternative workforce in the absence of non-regular workers. More importantly, since non-regular workers do not have access to the workplace after their employment contracts are cancelled, they have no choice but to campaign outside the workplace. Since these struggles by non-regular workers do not bring about work stoppage and consequently do not put enough pressure on employers, they tend to be longer and more confrontational than those of regular workers (Cho, 2011).

The most vulnerable group of non-regular workers are the indirectly hired workers (Cho, 2011). Directly hired non-regular workers could have an opportunity to negotiate with their employers under the Korean labour laws which stipulate that employers should negotiate in good faith when there is a negotiation request from the regular workers. However, employers tend to be ignorant of the demands of indirectly hired non-regular workers such as in-house subcontracted workers and agency-employed workers because the main contractors have the most power in deciding the working and employment conditions of indirectly hired workers. Agencies and subcontractors tend to avoid union recognition which could disrupt relations with clients and lead to lost business. Furthermore, the competitive nature of the industry prohibits agencies and subcontractors from making concessions to unions which could erode their competitiveness. Thus, although agencies want union recognition, they prefer one which did not disrupt relations with clients or inflate costs (Heery, 2004b).

Even though the number of non-regular workers taking collective action to improve their employment conditions has increased, the types of such struggles have not been examined in previous researches. If these struggles are indeed confrontational by nature (Cho, 2011; Lee & Lee, 2003), then it is necessary to identify how and what made these workers take collective action. In addition, although a significant number of previous studies emphasised the importance of external solidarity with regular workers to the success of the struggles by non-regular workers, these studies did not pay much attention to the role of internal resources such as union density and funds as key factors in developing struggle tactics. Furthermore, previous studies assumed that struggles by non-regular workers are homogenous, that is, they are all confrontational in nature and have a long-term duration. However, in reality, it is possible that such struggles can take various forms. For instance, while some are not any different from the struggles of regular workers, others differ in the level of confrontations and struggle duration. The following section describes how the mapping criteria are developed based on the theoretical reviews and how the map is constructed using these criteria.

III. Theoretical Background

Many previous studies have pointed out that the various types of struggles by South Korean non-regular workers stem from low organisational strength, low union density and low strike power (Cho, 2011; Jin & Kim, 2007; Lee & Lee, 2003). Since previous literatures have identified the key factors of capacity for the unions representing only for the non-regular workers, this study used the theoretical frames for unions in general. The power of a union is determined by the union’s capacity to represent workers’ interests, regulate work and affect social change (Lévesque & Murray, 2010).

The power resources of unions are important in that they enable unions to change the relevant context. Four types of resources seem particularly important to the success of unions. First, internal solidarity enables collective cohesion among members, which in turn enables them to pursue their goals and enhance union power. Unions’ collective identities concern the degree of membership cohesion and the basic internal mechanics of union representation. Membership cohesion pertains to the presence and density of a union’s network delegates, stewards or representatives in the workplace. Meanwhile, the internal mechanics pertain to the existence and regularity of mechanisms and procedures which ensure links to members and to particular groups of members (Hyman, 2007; Lévesque & Murray, 2010). Other requirements of internal solidarity are the existence and relative effectiveness of different means of communication among members, stewards and union leaders, and membership participation and quality of engagement.

Second, network embeddedness is crucial for unions because they need to be linked to their own and other union organisations, community groups, social movements and other actors. An integral part of network embeddedness is vertical and horizontal solidarity, which enables unions to connect with a larger group of workers. Horizontal links refer to the networks formed with unions in the same sector or with the same employer. Vertical links refer to the networks formed with regional, industrial, national and international structures (Anner et al, 2006). Trade unions are likely to develop and promote their own agenda, which enables them to influence the change process through building either or both vertical and horizontal networks. Another key dimension of network embeddedness is the density of the network, which relates to the intensity, thickness and permanency of contacts within and between unions. Dense networks with strong ties can potentially leverage the greater power of unions.

Third, infrastructural resources determine the capacity of unions; unions differ greatly depending on the extent and sophistication of their infrastructural resources (Hyman, 2007). Infrastructural resources pertain to the financial and material resources available to the union, which include the amount of dues, number of paid and unpaid union officials and meeting space for their activities. Fourth, human resources are another important resource for unions. Human resources include the knowledgeable experts available, who can help unions draw effective strategies based on calculating the costs and benefits of pursuing the union objectives (Kelly & Heery, 1989).

Based on the discussions of the previous studies (Anner et al., 2006; Hyman, 2007; Kelly & Heery, 1989; Lévesque & Murray, 2010), specific resources such as internal solidarity, external solidarity and financial resources appear to be important to the capacity of non-regular workers’ unions. This study identifies the types of struggles of non-regular workers according to their internal solidarity, resources and external solidarity with regular workers. By mapping the non-regular workers’ external solidarity with regular workers and the resources available to them, it is possible to identify the various types of struggles of non-regular workers and predict the direction of the non-regular workers’ struggles.

IV. Typology of the Struggle of Non-regular Workers

1. Mapping non-regular workers’ struggles

To map non-regular workers’ struggles, first of all, based on the discussion of the previous studies the mapping criteria were carefully selected. In this study, internal solidarity, financial resources and network density with regular workers’ unions were used as mapping criteria.

Second, the mapping criteria variables were converted into standardised values because each measured variable has different values and scales. With these standardised values, the MDS method was used to locate each case. The MDS is useful in classifying data to find the empirical relationships among them (Mead, 1992). It is an effective tool for producing inductive but empirically derived typologies. A benefit of MDS-based typologies is that they are less prone to researchers’ biases than typologies developed through other methods (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The final step involved identifying similar attributes among the cases, from which the various dimensions are determined.

2. Methodology and sample description

The study was carried out in 2011 and was designed to identify the types of union struggles based on the criteria of internal solidarity, resources and network with regular workers. Internal solidarity was measured by each union’s density. Power resources were measured by the financial resources available for the unions’ collective actions. Network density was determined by the support a union receives from regular workers of the same workplace. Network density as external solidarity was measured with the level of pressure put by regular workers’ unions to their employers for the employment security of non-regular workers, negotiation taken by regular workers for the non-regular workers, and supportive sentiments of regular workers toward non-regular workers.

The non-regular workers surveyed in this study were those who had participated in collective actions within the ten-year period of 2001 to 2010. The Korean Metal Workers’ Union (hereafter KMWU) and the Korean Public & Social Service Workers’ Union (hereafter KPSU) provided annual reports on such struggles from their affiliates and provided us with the names and contact information of representatives of unions. The first stage of the research involved reviewing the cases of strikes by non-regular workers from previous studies and strike reports documented and provided by non-regular workers. A total of 17 major struggles by indirectly hired non-regular workers were identified. With the reference from the union officials of the KMWU and KPSU, I contacted union representatives from 17 cases, yielding 34 target interviewees. Two union representatives from each workplace (one from the regular workers’ union, who can provide information on external solidarity, and another from the non-regular workers’ union, who can provide information on internal solidarity and struggle resources) were invited for interview. Representatives from four unions refused to answer the interview questions either because they were no longer involved in union activities, or information on the struggle was not available. Finally, a total of 26 respondents from 13 cases were able to answer the interview questions. Half of these respondents were representatives or former representatives from non-regular workers’ unions, and the remaining half were representatives from regular workers’ unions from the same workplaces as the non-regular workers’ union. The surveys were administered through email, phone calls and face-to-face interviews in September and October of 2011.

To identify the types of struggles, the researcher asked the respondents about the number of meetings their unions had with employers to negotiate their demands. In addition, the respondents were also asked regarding the length of the strike, strike location and use of extreme tactics such as physical confrontation. Meanwhile, the internal solidarity of the unions was determined from the density of the non-regular workers’ unions. The unions’ financial resource levels were determined from the average amount of funds available per person. The network density with organised regular workers was determined based on the level of pressure placed by the regular workers’ unions on employers, that is, whether or not the regular workers’ unions officially demanded employers to negotiate with non-regular workers or whether they negotiated with their employers on behalf of the non-regular workers. Table 1 shows the description of the data.

<Table 1> Measures and data description: Financial resource, Internal solidarity, and External solidarity

Criteria	Variable names	Measures	Min.	Max	M	S.D.
Financial Resource	Funds	Total funds divided by duration (months) and average monthly number of persons involved	2.5	271.29	59.37	92.03
Internal solidarity	Union density (%)	%	5	100	55.73	33.06
External Solidarity (Network density with regular workers’ unions)	Pressure by regular workers’ unions	1 = Very low, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High, 5 = Very high	1	5	2.53	2.02
	Negotiation by regular workers’ unions	0 = None, 1 = Yes	0	1	0.38	0.5
	Supportive sentiments by regular workers’ unions	1 = Very low, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High, 5 = Very high	1	5	3.07	1.84

<Table 2> Measures and data description: Strikes (Period, Location, Tactics used, and Number of monthly negotiations)

Criteria	Variable names	Measures	Min.	Max	M	S.D.
Struggle	Period	Duration of struggle (months)	3	64	18.53	17.07
	Location	1 = Outside the workplace, 2 = Inside the workplace, 3 = Inside the workplace and work stoppage	1	3	1.92	0.95
	Extreme tactics	1 = None, 2 = Burning, stripping and hunger strikes	0	1	0.8	0.50
	Number of monthly negotiations	Total number of negotiations/total struggle period	0	7.33	1.16	1.98

Based on the analysis of the cases in the sample, compared to the 2008 national average duration of collective actions by workers in South Korea, which was 37 days (Kim, Lee, Chun, Bae, & Chun, 2009 ; 22), the average duration of the struggles in this study was significantly longer at 18 months. This shows that the negotiation power of these non-regular workers’ unions is not strong, as evidenced by their inability to facilitate work stoppages to put pressure on their employers. The average union density of the cases is around 55.7%, which is much higher than the union density of non-regular workers in South Korea. The findings also showed that most of the workers involved in the struggles were forced to campaign outside their workplaces. Some of the workers in the struggles used militant tactics such as hunger strikes, stripping and burning oneself to death. The average number of monthly negotiations was around 1.16, while the average funds available was USD $63.7. The pressure placed by regular workers on employers was measure on a 5-point Likert scale, and the average level was around 2.53. Meanwhile, the average number of negotiations by regular workers on behalf of non-regular workers was 0.38, which means that regular workers tend to hesitate with regard to becoming involved with the issues of non-regular workers. The regular workers’ supportive sentiments towards non-regular workers, measured on a 5-point Likert scale, is average about 3 points.

The union density of non‐regular workers in South Korea is around 2–3% and that of regular workers around 22%. Overall, the average union density in South Korea is about 10% (Shin, 2010).

3. Results of multidimensional scaling

The MDS program used in this study was alternative least squares scaling (ALSCAL) in PASW. The results from the ALSCAL analysis indicate the similarity or dissimilarity between objects; the output shows the geometric configuration of points as on a map. The more similar objects are, the closer they will be on the multidimensional space. Another useful aid in interpreting the MDS results is to plot the variables by using the factor loadings as coordinates.

The five variables entered in the principal components analysis with varimax rotation were union density, which represent internal solidarity; monthly funds, which represent the struggle resources; and the level of pressure on employers by regular workers, negotiation by regular workers on behalf of non-regular workers, and supportive sentiments of regular workers, which represent external solidarity. Figure 1 shows the component plot. Variables at the end of red and blue axis are those which have high loadings on each factor, from which the location of each variable is identified.

Using the standardised Z scores of each variable indicating the internal solidarity, resources and network density with regular workers, the MDS was performed. The results of the MDS are shown in Figure 2 with stress=0.13 and RSQ=0.92. Group A (Kumho Tire Company, General Motors [GM]-Changwon plant, Kia Motors-Kwangju plant, Kia Motors-Hwasung plant) consists of struggles which have very high network density with regular workers and relatively high internal solidarity and funds. Group B (Hyundai HYSCO, COSCOM, two janitors’ unions) are struggles with very high internal solidarity and funds but low network density with regular workers. Group C (Hyundai-Ulsan plant, Donghee Auto, Kiryung Electronics Company, GM-Bupyeong plant) are those with relatively low network density with regular workers, internal solidarity and funds. Finally, Group D (E-Land) includes those with relatively high network density with regular workers but very low internal solidarity and funds. To determine the differences in terms of strikes, periods of strikes, number of negotiations, extreme tactics and locations among the struggles in the above four dimensions, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was used. The results of the test are shown in Table 3 and 4.

According to Kruskal and Wish (1991), the values of stress above 0.10~0.15 indicate an acceptable fit of the data to the selected model.

[Fig. 1] Multidimensional scaling plot of the 13 sample cases of non-regular workers’ struggles.

The unions in Group A were able to campaign inside their workplaces and facilitate work stoppages, which placed substantial pressure on their employers. This group had

<Table 3> Description of each group: Variables used for the MDS analysis by each group

Group (Number of unions)	Mean S.D.	Resource: Average monthly fund per person (US$)	Internal solidarity: Union density	Network density with regular workers as external soildarity
				1. Pressure by regular workers1)	2. Negotiation by regular workers2)	3. Supportive sentiments by regular workers3)
Group A (4 unions)	M	7.3	70%	5	2	4.5
	S.D	3.1	11.5	0	0	0
Group B (4 unions)	M	173.5	88%	1	1	2.5
	S.D	120.3	14.15	0	0	1.91
Group C (4 unions)	M	19.8	27%	1	1	1.3
	S.D	14.2	29	0	0	0.5
Group D (1 union)	M	17.7	10%	5	1	5
	S.D	63.1	57.62%	2.54	1.31	2.92
TOTAL	N	13	13	13	13	13
	S.D	97.8	33.75	2.03	0.48	1.85
F-value		4.816	6.035	-	13.615	5.929
P-value		0.029	0.015	-	0.001	0.016
주 : 1) 1 = Very low, 5 = Very high 2) 1 = No, 2 = Yes 3) 1 = Very high, 5 = Very low

<Table 4> Description of strikes by each group

Group (Number of unions)	Mean S.D.	Duration (months)	No. of negotiations	Location1)	Extreme tactics2)
Group A (4 unions)	M	6.2	2.9	3	0
	S.D	4	3.1	0	0
Group B (4 unions)	M	11.8	0.8	2	0.5
	S.D	4.6	0.24	1.2	0.6
Group C (4 unions)	M	38	0.09	1.3	0.6
	S.D	19	0.16	0.5	0.5
Group D (1 union)	M	17	0	1	0
TOTAL	M	18.5	1.1	2	1.4
	N	13	13	13	13
	S.D	17.1	1.9	1	0.5
F-value		5.805	1.805	4.579	2.275
P-value		0.017	0.216	0.033	0.149
주 : 1) 1 = Outside, 2 = Inside, 3 = Inside and work stoppage 2) 0 = None, 1 = Burning, stripping, and hunger strikes

the shortest strike duration among the other struggle groups. Owing to the additional pressure from the regular workers’ unions on the employers, the unions in Group in  A were able to meet with their employers around thrice a month to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment. They did not resort to extreme tactics, and thus, their struggles resembled those of regular workers. Because they followed institutionalised procedures just like regular workers, these struggles are called ‘institutionalised struggles’.

In contrast to the unions in Groups C and D, those in Group B have very high levels of funds and internal solidarity (88%) and sustained their struggles using various tactics and methods. Among the four unions, two (Hyundai HYSCO and Janitors’ Union of Ulsan College) successfully campaigned inside the workplace. However, the other two unions (COSCOM and Janitors’ Union of Kwangju City Hall) attempted to campaign inside the workplace but were eventually forced out by the employers and regular workers. The duration of the struggles in this group was 11 months on average, shorter than the durations for Groups C and D. Some extreme tactics were used during the strikes. For instance, workers in two of the four unions in this group stripped off their clothes in defiance of the riot squads who were forcing them out of the workplace.

Since the unions in this group have sufficient resources to sustain their struggles, they were able to campaign outside their workplaces. They also implemented effective strategies for increasing mass media visibility, which enabled them to gain support from the general public, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and external organisations. The support from these organisations enabled them to effectively put pressure on the employers to respond to their demands, after which they were able to return to their work. Because these unions were able to raise public awareness and support, they are called ‘externalised struggles’.

Owing to the individualised and fragmented nature of the unions in Group C, they are called ‘fragmented struggles’. Unions in this group have very low internal solidarity (27% density level), resources and external solidarity from organised regular workers, relative to those in Groups A and B. Consequently, their struggles lasted around 38 months on average, longer than those of the other groups. They also campaigned outside the workplace since there was low support from the regular workers. Owing to their low negotiation power, they resorted to extreme tactics to put pressure on employers to respond to their demands and to raise awareness and sympathy from other workers, the media and the public.

The union in Group D is called a ‘substituted struggle’ because it depended significantly on the regular workers to put pressure on the employer and negotiate on its behalf. Although the supportive sentiments by regular workers were the highest in this group, it had insufficient resources and the lowest internal solidarity (10% density level). Despite the high support from the regular workers, they were not able to meet with their employers to negotiate better employment terms and conditions.

In summary, Group C had the longest struggle durations owing to the unions’ low internal solidarity, resources and network density with regular workers. Group A had the shortest struggle duration owing to the unions’ high levels of internal solidarity and network density. With the exception of the unions in Groups A and B, the non-regular workers’ unions were unable to cause work stoppages and put effective pressure on employers.

V. Characteristics of the Struggle Typology of Non-regular Workers

The MDS identified four main types of non-regular workers’ struggles based on level of internal solidarity, resources and network density with organised regular workers: institutionalised, externalised, substituted and fragmented struggles.

1. Institutionalised struggles

Institutionalised struggles did not differ much from the struggles of regular workers. Because of the significant support from the organised regular workers’ unions, non-regular workers were able to negotiate with employers on issues such as employment security, wages and working conditions. On average, unions in this group were able to meet with their employers almost three times a month to negotiate better terms. In institutionalised struggles, although employers may have attempted to avoid negotiations in the beginning, they were eventually pressured by regular workers into recognising non-regular workers as a legitimate negotiation partner. Owing to the support from regular workers, institutionalised struggles often achieved their goals without resorting to extreme tactics, and with a shorter duration (6 months) than in other groups.

Overall, regular workers’ unions involved in this group have created an organisational culture which encouraged them to sympathise with non-regular workers. For instance, the regular workers’ union of both Kia Motors-Hwasung plant and Kia Motors-Kwangju plant supported the non-regular workers by distributing informational leaflets to regular worker union members to raise awareness on the struggles of the non-regular workers. They sat together with non-regular workers during negotiations. This strategy proved a significant help to the non-regular workers, who had relatively less experience in union activities and negotiations.

Similarly, the regular workers’ union at the Kumho Tire Company provided significant support to the non-regular workers. First, it was the regular workers’ union which initiated the establishment of the subcontracted workers’ union. Subcontracted workers had difficult terms and working conditions. For instance, they were only paid around 40% of regular workers’ wages, were often exposed to dangerous work and did not receive medical benefits. The regular workers’ union then conducted weekly educational campaigns to persuade their members to support the subcontracted workers. They also collected funds for the non-regular workers’ struggles and joined them in their strike. Although the company at first refused to concede the non-regular workers’ demand for direct employment, they eventually granted their demands following pressure from the regular workers. At their general assembly in November 2003, the regular workers decided to support the subcontracted workers and raised funds for the subcontracted workers’ union. Regular workers’ unions at the GM-Changwon plant and Kia Motors Kwangju plant were similarly able to negotiate better employment terms and conditions for their non-regular worker counterparts.

2. Externalised struggles

The unions in this group had high internal solidarity (greater than 80% density level, higher than the average density among all the groups) coming from the significant support they received from regular and non-regular workers in other unions in the region. They also had the highest financial resources among the groups. They were able to raise significant funds with the help of the regional branches of their parent unions, as well as from the significant contributions of fellow non-regular workers in other regions. Many regular and non-regular workers from other workplaces also participated in the campaigns to support non-regular workers. Although unions in this group did not gain support from the regular workers, they were still able to put pressure on their employers using their strong internal solidarity and significant financial resources. Although the duration of their struggles (11 months) were somewhat higher than that of unions in Group A, it is still considerably shorter than those of the fragmented and substituted struggles.

The Janitors’ Unions of Kwangju City Hall and Ulsan College had significant experience in union activities. These unions were both established in 2004, and were both supported by the KCTU. For instance, during their strike in 2007, the janitors of Kwangju City Hall were able to sustain their 14-month long struggle owing to their significant funds, which they raised through the help of the regional KCTU branch. An experienced organiser from the KCTU regional branch also helped them develop effective struggle strategies. Similarly, the KCTU regional branch in Ulsan supported the struggles of the janitors at Ulsan College through financial and human resources. In every meeting, the KCTU regional branch representative appealed to the representatives of affiliated unions to provide solidarity and funds to the struggles of the janitors of Ulsan College. Thus, even though the janitor’s union did not receive support from the regular workers at the university, they were able to successfully campaign outside their workplace and gain public sympathy. The non-regular workers’ unions of COSCOM workers also enjoyed a similar success with the help of their KCTU regional branch.

3. Fragmented struggles

The non-regular workers in fragmented struggles tended to use extreme tactics when faced with non-responsive employers. Because they did not have sufficient funds or support from regular workers, the non-regular workers resorted to extreme tactics to gain sympathy from the public and put pressure on the employers. Their extreme tactics, however, differed from those of the janitors’ unions in the externalised struggles. The tactics used in this group of workers are intended to raise awareness from the public and fellow union members who are not participating in the struggles.

The extreme behaviours taken by non-regular workers in Group C have three distinctive aspects different from those used by the janitors in Group B. First, the extreme tactics by the non-regular workers in Group C were intended to call the attention of the public and media to their struggles. By doing so, they believed that employers would change their uncompromising attitudes and be responsive to their demands. However, the extreme behaviours conducted by janitors in Group B were not intentionally planned. The nine janitors involved in the Kwangju City Hall sit-in strike in the middle of the City Hall lobby stripped off their clothes in defiance of the riot squads who tried to drive them out. Meanwhile, the 23 janitors who occupied Ulsan College in protest against the dismissal decision of the university took their clothes off when regular workers used violence to stop their sit-in strikes.

Second, the regular workers at the same workplaces as the non-regular workers in fragmented struggles were unsupportive and even hostile to the non-regular workers, which made it possible for employers to take a harder stance against the non-regular workers’ demands. The employers did not recognise these unions as legitimate negotiation partners, and thus, hardly responded to their demands. In the case of the Kiryung Electronics Company, the regular male workers sided with the employers and called upon the non-regular workers to stop their protests. In the case of the Hyundai Ulsan plant, where the non-regular workers occupied one of five work sites, the regular workers union blocked the non-regular workers from accessing the strike site to prevent other non-regular workers from joining the strike. The regular workers also requested them to stop the strike. Without pressure from regular workers, the employers took a harder stance against the non-regular workers.

Third, the non-regular workers’ unions in this group had a low density rate (27% density level). Many workers did not join the unions either because of the prohibitive attitudes of the employers or because of low union instrumentality. Such low union density was not powerful enough to put pressure on employers to accept their demands for better employment conditions. Worse, the long duration of the struggles (38 months on average) and low level of funds made the union members exhausted, prompting many of them to leave the protests in order to get a job to support their families. Under these conditions, it was difficult for the unions to sustain their struggles. The sustainability of these struggles significantly depended on persuading inactive workers to join the struggles and members who have left the struggles to re-join. To this end, the remaining non-regular workers used extreme struggle behaviours.

Finally, struggles in this type are also characterised by individualism. Such extreme and individualistic behaviours include hunger strikes and burning their own bodies. There are relatively few workers involved in such extreme tactics. For instance, only two non-regular workers from the GM Daewoo-Bupyeong plant climbed up the 20-m traffic control tower at the central station of Bupyeong city and stayed there for 70 days to demand a good-faith negotiation of the workers’ reinstatement. Similarly, only one subcontracted worker from the Hyundai-Ulsan plant burned himself to death in protest against Hyundai employers, and one worker from the Donghee Auto Workers’ Union campaigned for more than 113 days on the main street where the Headquarters of Hyundai Motors was located, which has contracted with the Donghee subcontracting company, until he was reinstated in 2011.

4. Substituted struggles

Substituted struggles had high internal solidarity but low resources, and thus relied on the significant support from the regular workers within the workplace to successfully negotiate their demands. In the case of E-Land, both non-regular workers and regular workers were organised in the same union. When the company announced a lay-off of the non-regular workers, the regular workers realised that this decision could possibly affect their own job security as well. Thus, the regular workers’ union supported the non-regular workers by leading the campaign against their employer.

VI. Discussion and Conclusion

This study identified various types of struggles by non-regular workers in South Korea based on an empirical analysis. Previous studies overlooked the fact that struggles by non-regular workers can take various forms, and instead assumed that such struggles are homogeneous, that is, they are all confrontational in nature and have a long duration. In addition, since most of these studies focused on a single dimension, external solidarity, in the success of these struggles, they were unable to explain the success of struggles by non-regular workers’ unions with low external solidarity but high union density and resources.

Similar to the previous studies, the results of this study also showed that external solidarity was a key factor which increases the probability of non-regular workers to negotiate with their employers. However, the results of the analysis revealed that availability of resources and internal solidarity also played equally important roles for sustaining such struggles. Furthermore, depending on the level of external and internal solidarity, and financial resources, the tactics adopted by non-regular workers’ unions vary. As evidenced by the Kiryung, Hyundai Ulsan plant and GM-Bupyeong cases, non-regular workers’ unions with insufficient resources usually resort to extreme tactics to make their demands heard. They would not have been able to negotiate with employers without support from regular workers. In addition, the results also suggest that employers, when faced with an outbreak of strikes by non-regular workers, should build fair negotiation policies to prevent extreme actions by these unions.

This study has some limitations. First, due to the small sample size, the struggle types identified in this study would not be considered as an inclusive typology. Since it is not easy for the indirectly hired to take collective action, a sufficient number of struggle cases were not available, even though this study collected cases of struggles for ten years. Second, the resulting typology in this study is country specific; therefore, its generalisability would be limited. For example, the types of struggles in Western countries differ in that industrially based unions tend to accept non-regular workers as their legitimate union members.

A single study cannot prove the utility of a typology. Therefore, the proposed typology is only a starting point for further studies on this issue. First, the relationship between the success and various types of struggles needs to be investigated to identify which are effective for different conditions. Second, this study needs to be extended to those in other countries with different employment relations systems. Third, further studies should examine other dimensions other than the three analysed in this study for a more precise analysis.

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abstract

Typology of Non-regular Workers’ Struggles for Employment Security Based on the Internal Solidarity, External Network

Density and Resources

Joohee Kim

This study classifies and analyses the struggles of non-regular workers in South Korea for employment security and equality with regular workers. The increase in non-regular workers in South Korea was accompanied by an increase in the volume and volatility of their confrontations with employers. Unlike the collective actions of regular workers, those of non-regular or subcontracted workers tend to be long-term, extreme and unorganised. Using the multidimensional scaling technique and data from surveys and in-depth interviews with union workers and representatives, this study identifies four main types of confrontational struggles by non-regular workers, namely institutionalised, externalised, substituted and fragmented struggles. The findings of the analysis reveal that regular workers contribute to the success of the collective actions of non-regular workers by providing resources, leadership and expertise in union activities. In addition to the support of regular workers, the findings also showed that the availability of resources is also important for sustaining their struggles.

Keywords: Non-regular Workers, Employment Security, Solidarity, External Solidarity, Internal Solidarity, Struggle Resources